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CIVIL LIBERTIES GUARANTEES UNDER TRIBAL LAW:
A SURVEY OF CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISIONS
IN TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS
Elmer R. Rusco*
Native American societies have a unique legal position in the
American polity because they still retain the right to govern them-
selves according to cultural standards which are not those of the
general society.' Consequently, the Constitution does not automati-
cally restrain tribal governments. One important area in which
this is the case concerns protections for individual liberties against
tribal governments.
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).2
This law applied most of the Bill of Rights, in a slightly modified
form, to tribal governments; it also stated that the writ of habeas
corpus was available to persons alleging violations of the ICRA
by tribal governments. In 1978 the United States Supreme Court,
in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, upheld the ICRA and inter-
preted its meaning.' The Court ruled that the ICRA had not repealed
the immunity of suit against tribal governments; moreover, that
Congress had intended to allow only habeas corpus as a means
of enforcing the Act. This conclusion was reached because the
Court believed that "creation of a federal cause of action for the
enforcement of rights created" by the Act "plainly would be at
odds with the congressional goal of protecting tribal self-
government." 4
The chief effect of the holding in Martinez, absent Congressional
modification of the ICRA, is that the Indian Civil Rights Act
is primarily enforceable in tribal courts. "Tribal forums are
* Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Nevada-Reno.
Due to the inability of the law review staff to obtain certain materials cited in this
article, we have relied on the author's own research and expertise to verify those
materials.-Ed.
I. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDL&N LAW, 202-04, 660-72 (1982 ed.)
[hereinafter F. COHEN]; M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AmucAN INDU,, 730-78 (1973); GarcHEs
& WILKIsON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 255-63 (1st ed. 1979)
[hereinafter GETCHES & WILKINSON]. Ernest Schusky has called this legal status "the right
to be different." E. Scrusicy, THE RGHT TO BE INDLAN (1970).
2. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
1302-1303 (1968).
3. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 436 U.S. 49, 56 L. Ed.2d 106
(1978).
4. Id. at 64.
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available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA, and [the Act]
has the substantial and intended effect of changing the law which
these forums are obliged to apply." 5 This article deals with one
important aspect of the status of civil liberties in tribal forums.
Many tribal governments, though by no means all, operate on
the basis of written constitutions. This article examines all the
provisions dealing with civil liberties in 220 tribal constitutions
in force as of September, 1981, in all states except Alaska and
Hawaii. Slightly over half of these documents- 130-were written
under authority of the Indian Recoganization Act, 24 were written
under authority of the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 63 cite no
federal statute, and three are in the form of state statutes.6
There is a mistaken impression that almost all tribal constitutions
are the same, because they were all based on a mythical "model
constitution" produced by the Bureau of Indian Affairs when it
impl.emented the Indian Reorganization Act.7 The most obvious
thing about these constitutions, however, is that there is no single
pattern for dealing with civil liberties; many do not mention the
subject at all, and those which do deal differently with it, although
there are several patterns.
Provisions Asserting Cultural Difference
Surprisingly, few constitutions state that the purpose of the docu-
ment is to preserve tribal self-government and/or a distinctive tribal
inheritance. The constitution of the Confederated Tribes of Siletz
Indians of Oregon states that "Each duly enrolled member of the
Confederated Tribes ... shall have the following rights" and these
include: "the right to exercise traditional rights and privileges of
members of the Confederated Tribes ... where not in conflict
with other provisions of this Constitution, tribal laws and ordi-
nances, or the laws of the United States." 8 The "Purposes" section
of the same document says that the constitution is adopted and
the tribal government established:
in order to: (1) Continue forever, with the help of God, our
unique identity as Indians and as the Confederated Tribes...
5. Id. at 65.
6. Special thanks are due to Robert Farring of the Division, who provided me with
copies of the constitutions.
7. For example, it is mistakenly reported that there was a "model constitution"
in G. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMEucAN INDAN TRmIAsbi 97 (1980).




and to protect that identity from forces that threaten to diminish
it; (2) Protect our inherent rights as Indians and as a sovereign
Indian tribe; (3) Promote our cultural and religious beliefs and
to pass them on in our own way to our children, grandchildren,
and grandchildren's children forever .... I
The constitution of the Burns Paiute Indian Colony states that
one of the purposes of the document is "to exercise and protect
any individual or colony rights arising from any source including
but not limited to tradition, federal statute, state statute, common
law, or otherwise." 10
The constitution of the Crow Tribal Council states that the Crow
Tribe will make its own decisions "without Indian Bureau in-
terference or advice . . ." and that "the Crow Tribal Council,
regardless of same, hereby reserved [sic] unto itself the right to
initiate moves looking to the protection of the Crow tribal rights
and interests under their treaties and under the American constitu-
tion guaranteeing all basic human rights to all who live under
the American flag, and to the equal protection of the laws of
our country."" The Fort Mojave Indian Tribe states in its
constitution:
The members of the Fort Mojave Tribe shall continue undis-
turbed in their customs, culture, and their religious beliefs in-
cluding but not limited to, the customs of cremation, ceremonial
dancing and singing, and no one shall interfere with these prac-
tices, recognizing that we have been a people and shall continue
to be a people whose way of life has been different.'
2
The constitution of the Spokane Indian Tribe states that "Every
tribal member shall have.., the right to exercise traditional rights
and privileges of members of the tribe where not in conflict with
other provisions of this Constitution, Tribal laws and ordinances,
or the laws of the United States."' 3 The Statement of Purpose
of the same document says that "Our purpose shall be to promote




10. BuRNs PAuTrrE INDIAN COLONY CONST. art. 1, § 1.
11. CROW TRmAL CouNcIL CONST. art. VII, § 8.
12. FORT MOyAvE IrIAN CONST. art. V, § 2.
13. SPOKANE TRIE-SPoKANE RESERVATION TRIBE CONST. art. IV, § 1.
14. Id. at art. I.
1989]
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The Fort Sill Apache Tribe states in its governing document
that "The treaty rights of the Fort Sill Apache Tribe ... shall
not in any way be altered, abridged or otherwise affected by any
provision of this constitution and bylaws."' 5 The Prairie Band
of Potawatomi Indians states in its constitution that "We, the
Prairie Band of Potawatomi, do not accept a diminishing of our
sovereign status as a nation and of our vested and inherent rights
by the act of adopting this constitution."' 6
While some other governing documents implicitly assert a "right
to be different" in ways noted below, most constitutions do not
contain explicit statements of either this right or the right of
self-government.
Provisions Stating General Constitutional Principles
A few constitutions state general principles of constitutional,
democratic government, in formulations which do not conflict with
the principles of the general American political order. For instance,
the Gila River Indian Community of Arizona states in its con-
stitution that:
All political power is inherent in the people. Governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and
are established to protect and maintain individual rights.
A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government. 7
The constitution of the Colorado Indian Reservation states:
All members of the Colorado River Indian Tribes have certain
inherent rights, namely, the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the
acquiring and ownership of possessions, and pursuing happiness
and safety. These rights cannot be protected unless the members
recognize their corresponding obligations and responsibilities.' 8
The preamble to the governing document of the Fort Mojave Indian
Tribe states that the members of the tribe, "in order to ... enjoy
15. FORT SILL APACHE TIaBE OF OKLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
16. PRAmm BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS CONST. art. II, § 1.
17. GILA RivR INDIAN CommuNrrY OF ARIz. CONST. art. IV.
18. COLO. RIVER TRIBES OF THE COLO. RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION/ARIz. AND CAL.




and maintain our rights and privileges as citizens under the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States of America, do establish this
Constitution and Bylaws". 1 9 The Chickasaw Nation's constitu-
tion states the basic rights to alter or abolish forms of govern-
ment, in these words:
All political power is inherent in the people, and all free
governments are founded on their authority and instituted for
their benefit; and they have at all times the inalienable right
to alter, reform or abolish their form of government in such
a manner as they may think expedient; provided, such action
is taken pursuant to this Constitution.
2 0
The constitution of the Yankton Sioux Tribe states a free enter-
prise philosophy which some regard as basic constitutional principle
in the American polity. This document states that "[a]ll operations
under this Constitution shall be free from any system of collec-
tivism and/or socialism under any and all circumstances" and that
"[tihis Constitution shall stress to the fullest extent of its authority,
at all times, recognition of and operation under the private enter-
prise system and democratic way of life."
2'
The governing documents of six tribes parallel the wording of
the 9th amendment to the United States Constitution, asserting
the existence of rights not enumerated. The constitution of the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe asserts that "[t]he enumeration of certain
rights in this constitution shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by members of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe."1
22
Practically the same language is contained in the constitutions of
the Ak-Chin Indian Community, the Gila River Indian Community,
and the Pueblo of Isleta, plus the bylaws of the Salt River-Maricopa
Indian Community. The constitution of the Colorado River In-
dian Reservation combines such a declaration with a statement
of basic philosophy by stating, "All political power of the tribes
is inherent in the members. This constitution and bylaws is the
expression of the will of the members and enumeration of rights
and privileges herein shall not be construed to impair or deny
others retained by the members."123 While such provisions may
19. FORT MOjAvE INDiAN TiunE CONST. preamble.
20. CmCKASAWv NATION CONST. art. IV, § 2.
21. YANKTON Sioux TiUBAL BusiNEss AND CLAIMs Cohih. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
22. JIcARuLA APACHE TamE CONST. art. IV, § 3.
23. CoLO. RnR INDIAN TRIns CONST. art. III, § 1.
1989]
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reflect little more than a declaration of constitutidnal principle,
which has been the fate of the 9th amendment as interpreted by
the courts, in the Indian case they might be used to assert the
continued relevance of rights unique to Native Ahiericans.
Incorporating the ICRA
Twenty-two constitutions incorporate the Indian Civil Rights
Act ("ICRA") into the document, and do not go beyond it or
change it in any way. For example, the constitution of the Alturas
Indian Rancheria simply states that "The protection guaranteed
to persons by Title II of the ICRA of 1968 ... against actions
of a tribe in exercising its powers of self-government shall apply
to the Alturas Indian Rancheria, its officers and all persons within
its jurisdiction." 2 Similar wording is found in the constitutions
of seventeen other tribes, with only minor variations (such as omitting
"its officers and all persons within its jurisdiction.") Six constitutions
accomplish the same thing by listing specifically the rights guar-
anteed by the ICRA. For example, the governing document of
the Mississippi Band of Choctaws states that the tribe, "in exer-
cising powers of self-government shall not . . ." violate any of
the specific rights spelled out in Title II of the ICRA.2 5 The con-
stitution of the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah states that any fur-
ther amendment of the ICRA will be accepted "without requir-
ing the amendment of this constitution. '2 6
General Statements Accepting Federal and State Rights
Fifty-nine tribal constitutions contain general language asserting
that members of the tribe enjoy rights as citizens of the United
States and/or a state and stating that the tribal constitution does
not disturb these rights. For example, the constitution of the
Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town states that "This Constitution
shall not in any way be construed to alter, abridge or otherwise
jeapordize the rights and privileges of the members of this Tribal
Town as citizens of the Creek Nation, the State of Oklahoma
or of the United States." 27 Another formulation of this provision,
in the governing document of the Chehalis Reservation, says, "No
24. ALTuRAs INDIAN RANcHERIA/MODOC COUNTY, CAL. CONST. art. VIII.
25. Miss. BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS CONST. art. X.
26. PAIUTm INDIAN TRIE OF UTAH CONST. art. XIII. § 4.




member shall be denied any of the rights or guarantees enjoyed
by non-Indian citizens under the Constitution and Statutes of the
United States..." 28 The Constitution of the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma states that "[t]he Constitution of the United States is
the Supreme law of the land; therefore, the Cherokee Nation shall
never enact any law which is in conflict with any Federal law.''29
While not specifically referring to the Bill of Rights, this provision
might be read as a pledge by the Cherokee Nation not to violate
the Bill of Rights. The Pueblo of Laguna states in its governing
document that "Each member of the Pueblo of Laguna is hereby
assured of his rights as a citizen of the United States and no at-
tempt shall be made by the Council or the officers of the Pueblo
to enforce any order which shall deprive him of said rights."
' 30
In twenty-one cases, a general statement of this nature is follow-
ed by a listing of specific rights which the tribe cannot violate,
sometimes with the statement that the rights guaranteed by the
United States or state constitutions shall not be violated, "including
but not limited to" the specified rights. The meaning of provi-
sions of this sort is unclear but is of great importance; the issues
involved are discussed in the conclusion of this article.
Enumeration of Rights
Most of the provisions noted to this point deal with general
constitutional provisions. In addition to these or instead of such
general statements, the constitutions contain listings of specific
rights which members or non-members have against tribal govern-
ments. This section will describe the specific rights mentioned in
tribal governing documents.
First Amendment Rights
The most numerous specific guarantees are those protecting first
amendment rights. A total of eighty-nine constitutions list religious
freedoms and freedoms of expression together, while there are
numerous additional statements of first amendment rights. Thirty-
seven constitutions contain a statement essentially the same as that
contained in the constitution of the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma:
"All members of the Apache Tribe of Oklahoma shall enjoy,
28. CONFEDERATED TRIBEs OF THE CHEHALIs RESERVATION CONST. art. VIII.
29. CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLA. CONST. art. I.
30. PUEBLO OF LAGUNA/N. M. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
1989]
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without hindrance, freedom of worship, conscience, speech, press,
assembly and association."'" Another nine constitutions contain
essentially the same wording except that "may" is substituted for
"shall." Twenty-nine constitutions contain wording similar to that
in the governing document of the Chehalis Reservation, which
states that "freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of speech,
the right to orderly association or assembly, the right to petition
for action or redress of grievances. . ." shall not be abridged by
the tribal government.32 It is noteworthy that these summaries of
first amendment rights do not include a prohibition of the establish-
ment of religion. Several constitutions provide an even more in-
complete list of first amendment rights. For example, the con-
stitution of the Burns Paiute Indian Colony lists "freedom of wor-
ship, speech, press and assembly" only, and the constitution of
the Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe lists "freedom of speech, the right
to orderly association or assembly, the right to petition for action
or the redress of grievance. . .", but not religious freedom.33
Overall, a tabulation of specific first amendment rights among
the constitutions having a general first amendment provision shows
the following pattern:
Freedom of religion (and/or conscience and/or worship) 85
Freedom of speech (and/or to speak)* 88
Freedom of the press or to write* 56
Freedom of association and/or assembly, sometimes
qualified with the word orderly" 88
Freedom of petition (sometimes for redress
of grievances) 34
*The bylaws of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Com-
munity state that "Every member of the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community may freely speak, write or publish
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." '3 4
In addition to provisions listing more than one first amendment
right, various other specific provisions of tribal constitutions men-
tion first amendment rights. A number of provisions on religious
31. APAcHE TRIBE OF OKLA. CONST. art. X.
32. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHns RESERVATION CONST. art. VIII.
33. BuRNs PAI-rUE INDIAN COLONY CONST. art. X, § 3; SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE
CONST. art. VIII.




freedom obviously were written specifically for the situation of
the tribe. For example, several refer to traditional Native religious
beliefs or practices. For example, the constitution of the Miccosukee
Tribe states that "[tihe members of the tribe shall continue un-
disturbed in their religious beliefs and nothing in this constitution
and bylaws will authorize either the General Council or the Business
Council to interfere with these traditional religious practices ac-
cording to their custom."" The constitution of the Seminole Tribe
of Florida contains an almost identical provision.
While these two provisions dealing with religious freedom refer
only to traditional tribal beliefs, several other specific provisions
stating freedom of religion guarantee religious diversity. For ex-
ample, the constitution of the Pueblo of Laguna states, "All
religious denomminations shall have freedom of worship in the
Pueblo of Laguna, and each member of the Pueblo shall respect
the other members' religious beliefs." 3 6 The constitution of the
Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town states that "no member shall
be treated differently because he does or does not believe in or
take part in any religion or religious custom." 37 The constitution
of the Cocopah Tribe says that "[t]he members of the tribe shall
continue undisturbed in their religious beliefs and nothing in this
Constitution will authorize the Tribal Council to interfere with
religious practices." 3 The Gila River Indian Community of
Arizona states in its governing document that "Freedom of religion
or conscience shall not be abridged," and the constitution of the
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin forbids the tribe to "make
or enforce any law ... prohibiting the free exercise of religion
or of the dictates of conscience .... -9 An unusually detailed pro-
vision on religious freedom is found in the bylaws of the Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian community, which state that:
The liberty of conscience secured by the provisions of this
constitution and bylaws shall not be construed as to excuse acts
of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
and safety of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Communi-
ty. Persons who are not members of the Salt River Pima-
35. MIccosuKEE TRIBE OF INDLANs OF FLA. CONS?. art. VI, § 1.
36. PUEBLO OF LAGUNA/N. M. CONST. art. VIII. § 2.
37. ALA.-QuASSARTE TRIBAL ToNN/OKLA. CONST. art. IX.
38. CocoPAH TRIBE/Som:ERToN, Aaiz. CONsT. art. VII.
39. GILA RIVER INDIAN CoafuNrrY OF ARIZ. CONST. art. IV.
1989]
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Maricopa Indian Community may not act as missionaries or
ministers of religion within the boundaries of the Salt River
Pirna-Maricopa Indian Community except upon proof satisfac-
tory to the community council that they are of good moral
character and that their presence within the reservation will not
disturb peace and good order.
40
Obviously, this provision limits religious freedom as it is ordinarily
understood. A more limited but similar provision is part of the
constitution of the Cherokee Tribe of North Carolina, which is
part of the Private Laws of North Carolina. This document states
that "Free exercise of religion, worship and manner of serving
God shall be forever enjoyed, but not contrued [sic] as to excuse
act of licentiousness.'"4
A few tribal constitutions contain at least partial bans on an
establishment of religion. For example, the constitution of the
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin states that the tribe "shall
not... establish an official government religion...,,"2 The govern-
ing document of the Chickasaw Nation states, "No religious test
shall ever be required as a qualification for any office of public
trust in this Nation", and this language is repeated almost exactly
in the constitution of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma.4 3 The
constitution of the Quechan Tribe requires that "[t]he Council
shall at all times be non-partisan and non-sectarian in character." 4
The one provision in a tribal constitution which can be con-
strued as establishing a religion, at least in part, is a provision
of the Private Laws of North Carolina, the constitution of the
Cherokee Tribe of North Carolina. This statute states that no per-
son is eligible to an "office or appointment of honor, profit or
trust" within the tribe "who denies the existence of a God or
a future state of rewards and punishments." '4' However, the bylaws
of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community permit some
support of religious activities, in these words:
No public money shall be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of
40. SALT RrvER PMA-MARICOPA CONST. art. IV, § 7.
41. N. C. Priv. L., ch. 207, § 18 (1897).
42. MENOMINEE INDAN TmIE OF Vis. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
43. CHICKASAW NATION CONST. art. IV, § 3; CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLA. CONST.
art. IV, § 2.
44. QuEcrIAN TRIBE/FoRT YUMA, CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.




any religious establishment; but this shall not prevent the com-
munity council in its discretion from setting apart areas of tribal
land for use rent free as sites of houses of worship or other
religious activities. No religious-qualifications shall be required
for any public office or employment...,6
The same bylaws contain a unique provision stating that no per-
son shall be "incompetent as a witness or juror in consequence
of his opinion on matters of religion nor be questioned touching
his religious beliefs in any court of justice to affect the weight
of his testimony.""
Several constitutions limit freedoms of expression. For exam-
ple, the constitution of the Chickasaw Nation states, "Every citizen
shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any
subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege, and no
law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech, or of
the press." 48 The constitution of the Gila River Indian Commu-
nity of Arizona states, "Every person may freely speak, write,
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right."4 9 Two constitutions apparently restrict freedom of
speech guarantees to tribal activities. The constitution of the Choctaw
Nation of Oklahoma states that "[t]he right that every member
has to speak, write or publish his opinions on matters relating
to the Choctaw Nation shall never be abridged"." The constitution
of the Crow Tribal Council says, "Every member of the Crow
Tribe, outside of the exception herein provided for, shall have
equal opportunities to discuss any and every question of tribal
concern before the council, and to participate, without interference,
in all votes taken upon any such questions." ' 5' (It is not clear what
the exception is).
The constitution of the Chickasaw Nation and the Choctaw
Nation of Oklahoma contain virtually identical provisions to the
effect that "[t]he citizens shall have the right, in a peaceable man-
ner, to assemble together for their common good and to apply
to those vested with powers of government, for redress of
grievances or other purposes by address or remonstrance."
5 2
46. SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA BYLAws art. IV, § 7.
47. Id.
48. CHICKASAW NATION CONST. art. IV, § 4.
49. Gn.A RIVER INDiAN COMMuNITY OF AIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
50. CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
51. CRow TRiBAL COUNCM CONST. art. VII, § 10.
52. CHICKASAW NATION CONST., art. IV, § 5; CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLA. CONST.
art. IV, § 4.
1989]
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A unique provision regarding freedom of speech appears in the
constitution of the Quechan Tribe, which states, "Nothing herein
stated in this article shall serve to prevent the exercise of free speech
and action in any matter not having to do with the deliberations
of the Council."
'53
The constitution of the Gila River Indian Community of Arizona
contains another unique provision to the effect that "[a]ll elections
shall be free and equal, and no power shall at any time interfere
to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." 54 A number
of constitutions include provisions specifying who may vote in
tribal elections; these have not been included bere because they
do not directly create rights of individuals against tribal govern-
ments. But of course, they do so indirectly; where voting rules
are specified in constitutions, a right to vote undoubtedly exists.
Guarantees of Equality
After first amendment rights, guarantees of equality are most
common in tribal constitutions. A total of seventy-three constitu-
tions contains some guarantee of equality, usually more detailed
than the equal protection clause of the ICRA and the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. A
guarantee of "equal protection of the laws" does occur in eleven
constitutions; however, in one of these, that of the Menonimee
Indian Tribe of Wisconsin, the clause is qualified by the provi-
sion that "this clause shall not be interpreted to grant to non-
tribal members those rights and benefits to which the tribal
members are entitled by virtue of their membership in the Tribe.""
Twenty-seven constitutions contain a provision for equality of
economic participation in tribal activities, of which the constitution
of the Blackfeet Tribe is typical: "All members of the tribe shall
be accorded equal opportunities to participate in the economic
resources and activities of the reservation." 6 A very similar state-
ment, but including "political rights", is found in eleven constitu-
tions. An example of this approach is the constitution of the
Cocopah Tribe, which reads: "All members of the tribe shall be
accorded equal political rights and equal opportunities to participate
53. QucHAi TRIE/FoRT YtrA, CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
54. GLA RIVER INDIAN CommNrY OF Amz. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
55. MENOMINEE INDIAN TRmE OF Wis. CONST. art. IX, § 2(g).
56. BLACKFEET TRiBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION OF MONT. CONST.




in the economic resources and activities of the tribe."" Still another
very similar provision is found in six constitutions, of which the
constitution of the Ely Indian Colony is an example: "All members
of the Ely Indian Colony shall have equal rights, equal protection,
and equal opportunity to participate in the economic resources,
tribal assets, and activities of the Colony.""8 Still another form
of such a constitutional provision guarantees life, liberty or pursuit
of happiness to members; three constitutions contain such provisions.
Twelve constitutions contain a provision essentially like the sec-
tion of the constitution of the Absentee-Shawnee Tribe of Indians
of Oklahoma which states: "All members of ... the Tribe...
shall be accorded equal rights pursuant to tribal law." 5 9
Finally, several other constitutions contain pledges of economic
equality more specific than any of those cited above. For exam-
ple, the governing document of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of
Oklahoma states, "All enrolled members of the tribes shall be
eligible for all rights, privileges, and benefits given by this con-
stitution and by-laws, such as claims, credits, acquisition of land,
all educational grants, and any other future benefits." 6 The con-
stitution of the Pueblo of Santa Clara states that "all lands of
the pueblo ... shall forever remain in the pueblo itself and not
in the individual members thereof," but that "[a]ll the members
of the pueblo are declared to have an equal right to make beneficial
use, in accordance with ordinances of the council, of any land
of the pueblo which is not heretofore or hereafter assigned to
individual members."
' 61
A related provision of the bylaws of the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community reads: "No law granting irrevocably
any privilege, franchise, or immunity shall be enacted." 62
A number of the equality provisions allow for exceptions
specified in the constitution. For instance, the constitution of the
Lovelock Tribe guarantees "equal rights, equal protection and
equal [economic] opportunity" except for assignment of lands;
another provision states that in tribal assignment of lands,
57. Coco'AH TRBE/SomERToN, ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
58. ELY INsiAN COLONY CONST. art. VIII.
59. ABSENTEE-SHAWNEE TRiBE OF INDIANs OF OKLA. CONST. art. X.
60. CHEYENNE-ARAPAHO TRmES OF OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 7.
61. PUEBLO OF SANTA CLARA/N. M. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
62. SALT RIVER PImA-MARICOPA BYLAis art. IV, § 5.
19891
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"preference shall be given first to members of the. . .Tribe who
are heads of a household.
' 63
Protection of Property Rights
Protection for individual property rights, in some cases
specifically allotted lands, is provided for in thirty-five constitu-
tions. In 14 cases, the wording of the provision is essentially the
same as a provision of the constitution of the Alabama-Quassarte
Tribal Town, which reads: "The individual vested property rights
of any member of the Tribal Town shall not be altered, abridged,
or otherwise affected by the provisions of this Constitution by [sic]
By-laws without the consent of such individual member.
' 6 4
Another fifteen constitutions contain essentially the same wor-
ding except for omission of the word "vested." Other provisions
saying essentially the same thing include the constitution of the
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma, which declares, "In-
dividual rights in allotted and inherited lands shall not be disturbed
by anything contained in this constitution and by-laws," by the
constitution of the Santee Sioux Tribe, which states that "Nothing
contained in this article shall be construed to deprive any Santee
Sioux Indian of any vested right," and by the constitution of the
Tule River Indian Tribe of California, which states that the Council
has the authority to provide for future memberships and adop-
tion in the tribe, "provided that property rights shall not be chang-
ed by any action under this section." 65 The constitution of the
Yankton Sioux Tribe provides that:
All allotted lands including heirship lands, belonging to any
member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe... shall continue to be
held as heretofore by their present owners... The rights of the
individual Indians to hold their lands under existing law shall
not be affected by anything contained in this Constitution and
By-Laws.66
Further, another provision of this document states, "In the process
of negotiating a lease all heirs shall be notified thereby indicating
rights will not be violated." 67
63. LovLocK PAiTE TRIBE CONST. art. VII, § 2.
64. ALA.-QuAsSARTE TRIEAL TowN/OKLA. CONST. art. IX.
65. CHEYENNE-ARAPAHo TRmES OF OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 2; SANT Sioux TRIBE
OF THE Sioux NATION OF THE STATE OF NE. CONST. art. II, § 7; TutE RIVER INDIAN
TRIBE/CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
66. YANKTON Sioux TRAL Busunss AND CLAIms Comm. BYLAws art. IV, § 3.




Finally, two constitutional provisions require tribal governing
bodies to respect individual property rights in making assignments
of tribal lands. The constitution of the San Carlos Apache Tribe
states that tribal land shall not be allotted to individuals, "but
assignment of land for private use may be made by the council
in conformity with ordinances which may be adopted on this sub-
ject, provided, that the rights of all members of the tribe be not
violated." 68 The Southern Ute Indian Tribe's constitution contains
an almost identical statement.69
These provisions obviously grew out of the creation of private
property in land within the reservations by allotment, followed
as a general policy by the national government and exemplified
in the General Allotment Act of 1887. While the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act of 1934 halted all new allotments, some parcels of land
within many reservations are still privately owned, by both Indians
and non-Indians."0
Due Process of Law
Due process of law is guaranteed by thirty-three constitutions.
In all but five cases, the constitutions merely say that "no person
shall be denied ... due process of law." In the cases of the Gila
River Indian Community and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, the ter-
minology is the same as that of the due process clauses of the
United States Constitution: "No person shall ... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law."' The con-
stitution of the Skokomish Indian Tribe uses the same wording
except that it refers only to liberty and property, while the bylaws
of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community add "be ex-
pelled from the ... Community" to this clause." The constitu-
tion of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin states that the
tribe will not "[d]eprive any person of liberty or property (1)
without fully complying with procedural processes of tribal law
or (2) application of tribal laws which have no reasonable rela-
tion to the purpose for which they were enacted.""
68. SAN CARLOS APAcHE TamE OF ARiz. CONST. art. X.
69. SoUTHmRN UTE INDiA TR BE OF THE SouTBERN UTE INDIAN RESERVATION, COLO.
CONST. art. VIII.
70. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 127-43.
71. GILA RIVER INDIAN CommuNrrY OF ARiz. CONST. art. IV, § 1; ROSEBUD SIOUX
TRIBE OF S. D. CONST. art. X, § 3.
72. SKOKOWSH INDIAN TRIE CONST. art. IX; SALT RIVER P'MA-MARiCOPA INDIAN
COMMNITr BYLAWs art. IV, § 1.
73. MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WIS. CONsT. art. IX, § 2(h).
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Discrimination by Gender
No constitution prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex,
but one constitution prohibits discrimination by sex in the filling
of tribal offices; the constitution of the Sac and Fox Tribe of
the Mississippi in Iowa states, "No person shall be disqualified
on account of sex from holding any office created by this Con-
stitution."'
Four tribal constitutions discriminate by gender in establishing
membership in the tribe. The constitution of the Cachil Dehe Band
of Wintun Indians provides that:
[i] f a female member marries a non-Indian, she will automatically
lose her membership and will be required to leave the Community
within ninety days after written notice has been served upon
her by the Business Committee; Provided, That this provision
shall not apply in the case of any marriages consummated prior
to the approval .of this Constitution and By-Laws."
The governing document of the Hopi Tribe of Arizona provides
that members shall be those on a tribal roll taken in 1937, those
born of mothers and fathers who were on this roll, and "[a]ll
children born after December 31, 1937, whose mother is a member
of the Hopi Tribe, and whose father is a member of some other
tribe." 76 The constitution of the Kiahlagee Tribal Town provides
that "[a]ll adult offspring of a marriage between a male member
of the Kiahlagee Tribal Town or Tribe may become members of
the Town by applying for admission, when accepted and approved
by a majority vote of the members present at any regular Kiahlagee
Tribal Town membership meeting." ' 77 One of the categories of
possible membership in Laguna Pueblo, as stated in its constitution,
is, "All persons of one-half or more Laguna Indian blood born
after approval of this revised Constitution (1) whose mother is
a member of the Pueblo of Laguna; or (2) whose father is a
member of the Pueblo of Laguna, provided the child is born in
wedlock."
7
Two constitutions discriminate by gender in setting minimum
74. SAC AND Fox TRmE OF TnE Miss. IN IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 4.
7:5. CAcfIm D= BAND OF \VINTON INDIANS OF THE COLUSA INDIAN COMMUNITY/CAL.
CONSI. art. II, § 4.
76. Hopi TpIBE/AIz. CONST. art. II, § 1.
77. KIALEGEE TRIBAL ToWN/OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 5.




ages for voting in tribal elections. The Crow Tribe's constitution
states that "[a]ny duly enrolled member of the Crow Tribe, except
as herein provided, shall be entitled to engage in the deliberations
and voting of the council, provided the females are 18 years old
and the males 21 years." 9 A resolution of the Quapaw Tribe
adopted in 1956, which functions as its constitution, states that
it is the desire of the individual male members, 21 years of age
and over, and female members, 18 years of age and over, to
establish a responsible administrative body to represent, speak
and act for the individual members of the Quapaw Tribe on
matters affecting the properties and general business of the
Tribe."0
Presumably this language specifies the voting rules for the Tribe.
Rights of the Accused
A relatively small number of constitutions provide explicitly for
rights of persons accused of crime. One form of a provision in
this area, which is essentially the same in four other constitutions,
is that of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation:
Any member of the Confederated Tribes accused of any
offense shall have the right to a prompt, open, and public hear-
ing, with due notice of the offense charged, and shall be
permitted to summon witnesses in his own behalf and trial by
jury shall be accorded, when duly requested by any member
accused of any offense punishable by more than 30 days' im-
prisonment, and excessive bail or cruel or unusual punishment
shall not be imposed.81
Essentially the same provision is found in eight other constitu-
tions, except for the provision "trial by jury may be demanded"
is substituted for "trial by jury shall be accorded, when duly re-
quested." These provisions set different penalties which will trigger
a jury trial. In ten cases, a jury trial is required if an offense
is punishable by more than 30 days' imprisonment; in two cases
79. CROW TAL CouNcr. CONST. art. III.
80. Resolution Delegating Authority to the Quapaw Tribal Business Committee (August
19, 1936).
81. CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAi TaRas OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVA-
TIoN/MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
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trial by jury is required if punishment may exceed 30 days' im-
prisonment or a fine of $45, and in one case trial by jury is re-
quired if the punishment exceeds 60 days' imprisonment or a fine
of $45.
Th.e constitution of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe states, "Any Indian
accused of any offense shall have the right to the assistance of
counsel and to demand trial by jury." Also, under this document
criminal defendants have the right to "a speedy and public trial." '8 2
The governing document of the Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin provides a right to a jury trial of not less than six
members for anyone accused of a "major offense" as defined
in the bylaws of the tribe, but the accused must request the trial
and must pay the expenses of the trial if the penalty for the of-
fense does not include the possibility of imprisonment.8 3 The con-
stitution of the Colorado River Indian Tribes of the Colorado
Indian Reservation guarantees the rights enjoyed under the United
States Constitution, including the right to "expeditious trial after
legal indictment or charge with opportunities for bail and protec-
tion against excessive punishment."" The constitution of the Gila
River Indian Community of Arizona provides that "justice in all
cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary
delay."'s The constitution of the Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin essentially repeats the protections for persons accused
of crime in the ICRA, but with slightly different wording. The
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community's bylaws provide
that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, no excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted."" This docu-
ment; also provides that "[a]ll persons charged with crime shall
be bailable by sufficient sureties", and also contains a complicated
set of guarantees for the accused, with some significant variations
from the pattern laid down in the ICRA. This provision states that:
In prosecutions or offenses against the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community, the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and to have some member of
the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community act as his
82. RoSm= Sioux TRIBE OF S. D. CONST. art. X, § 2.
83. MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WIs. CoNsr. art. IX, § 2(0(3).
84. CoLo. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES CONST. art. III, § 3.
85. GILA RIVER INDIAN COmmuNITY OF AiZ. CONST., art. IV, § 5.
86. MENOMiNEE INDIAN TRIE OF Wis. CONST. art. IX, § 1(0; SALT RVrR PIMA-




counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion against him, to testify in his own behalf, and to have a
speedy public trial; and in no instance shall any accused person
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed.87
Two constitutions protect the privacy of the home. The con-
stitution of the Gila River Indian Community of Arizona states
that "no person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law", and the bylaws of the
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community contain a provi-
sion identical except for punctuation.8 The constitution of the
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin provides elaborate protec-
tions against illegal searches and seizures in this provision, which
prohibits the Tribe to:
permit searches and seizures unless a Tribal Court issues a war-
rant upon a sworn statement presented to the Tribal Court show-
ing reasonable grounds to believe that an offense against tribal
law has been committed and that the person or place to be
searched holds evidence of the offense or that the person to
be seized committed the offense; or that the thing to be seized
is evidence of the offense, and describing specifically the person
or place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized;
provided that, searches and seizures may be permitted without
a warrant where justified by compelling circumstances as shall
be defined by ordinance.89
The privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed by only
three governing documents, the constitutions of the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe and the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin plus the
bylaws of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community. The
Menominee provision states that:
In any criminal proceeding against any person, [the Tribe
shall not] compel such person to be a witness against the person's
own interest including any instance where the person's testimony
reasonably might lead to the institution of criminal proceedings
against that person.9"
87. Id. at § 10 & 11.
88. GILA RIVER INDIAN Comm=fr OF AEIz. CON ST., art. IV, § 4; SALT RIVER PIMA-
MARICOPA INDIAN CoMifuNTY BYLAws art. IV, § 4.
89. MENOIIMEE INDIAN T~mE oF Wis. CONST. art. IX, § 2(d).
90. Id. at art. IX, § 2(f)(1).
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The protection against double jeopardy is provided only by the
same three documents. Only the constitution of the Blackfeet Tribe
states that anyone accused of a crime shall have "the right to
a bond", and only the constitution of the Menominee Indian Tribe
of Wisconsin and the bylaws of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community prohibit "excessive fines." 9'
Miscellaneous Provisions
There are a number of miscellaneous provisions protecting civil
liberties which are found in a small number of constitutions.
Six constitutions provide a right of tribal members to examine
tribal records. The constitution of the Cold Springs Rancheria
states, "Tribal members shall have the right to review all tribal
records, including financial records, at any reasonable time in ac-
cordance with procedures established by the tribal council." 92 The
other provisions on this topic are essentially the same except that
two of them omit the phrase "including financial records", and
two omit the word "all".
Only two governing documents provide for just compensation
for the public taking of private property. The governing docu-
ment for the Cherokee Tribe of North Carolina states that the
council may "appropriate to school, church or other public pur-
poses for the benefit of the band.. ." land owned by the band
and occupied by individuals. However, if it does so it is required
to pay just compensation to the owner for "improvements and
bette-rments" on the land, as determined by a jury of not less
than six members. 3 The section outlines various details of the
procedure which must be followed in such trials to determine the
amount of compensation. The bylaws of the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community provide that:
]Private property shall not be taken for public or private use
except for public ways of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or
ditches, on or across from the lands of others for mining,
agricultural, domestic, industrial, or sanitary purposes. 94
This statement is followed by the provision, noted above, requir-
ing that just compensation be paid for any such taking.
91. BLAcKF=-T TPUmE CONST., art. VIII, § 4; MENOMRNINNDIAN TRINE or WIs. CONST.
art. IX, § 2(0(4); SALT RIVER PmIA-MARIcopA BYLAws, art. IV, § 8.
92. COLD SPRINGs RANCHERiA CONST. art. X, § 4.
93. N. C. Priv. L., ch. 207, § 28 (1897).




Two constitutions and the bylaws of a tribe prohibit bills of
attainder. The constitution of the Menominee Indian Tribe of
Wisconsin forbids the tribe to "[e]nact any law imposing punish-
ment on one person", and the constitution of the Pueblo of Isleta
states that the council may not "enact any ordinances
discriminating against individuals specifically named." 95 The bylaws
of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community state, "No
bill of attainder .. . shall ever be enacted.' '96
Three governing documents have specific provisions against ex
post facto laws. The constitution of the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma states that "[n]o laws passed by the Council shall have
retroactive effect or operation" 97 and the constitution of the
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin says that the Tribe shall not:
enact any law which makes an action a crime which was not
a crime when such action was committed, or which increases
the punishment for a crime committed before the effective date
of the law, or which deprives a person in any accusatory pro-
ceeding of any substantial right or immunity to which the person
was entitled before the effective date of the law. 9
The bylaws of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
provide that "No ... ex post-factor law ... shall ever be
enacted." 99
The Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community is unique in
prohibiting laws impairing the obligation of a contract. The bylaws
of the tribe state, "No ... law impairing the obligation of a con-
tract shall ever be enacted." 1 '
The Zuni Tribe's constitution is unique in guaranteeing that
"no member shall be denied ... the right to bear arms.''"1
One constitution embodies protections for employees in the con-
stitution. The governing document of the Chickasaw Nation states,
"No employee having served in a position at least one (1) year
shall be removed from employment of the Chickasaw Nation ex-
95. MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF Wis. CONST. art. IX, § 2(i); PUEBLO OF ISLETA,
N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1().
96. SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN CommUNry BYLAWs art. IV, § 12.
97. CHEROKEE NATION OF OKRA. CONST. art. V, § 8.
98. MENOMNEE INDIAN TmE OF vis. CONST. art. IX, § 2(i).
99. SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN ConmAuNr BYLAws art. IV, § 12.
100. Id.
101. ZUNI TRmE/ZuNI RESERVATION, ZUNI, N. M. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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cept for cause. The employee shall be given a hearing under the
rules and procedures prescribed by the Tribal Council."' 12
Waiving Sovereign Immunity
The constitution of the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah is unique
in including an article partially waiving sovereign immunity in cases
involving the ICRA. This document states that:
[tihe tribe shall be subject to suit for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief in tribal courts by persons subject to tribal jurisdic-
tion for the purpose of enforcing rights and duties established
by this constitution, by the ordinances of the tribe, and by the
Indian Civil Rights Act ...103
However, another section of this article states that "members of
the tribal council and employees acting within the scope of their
authority or employment shall be personally immune from suit,
and said personal immunity shall extend beyond their term of of-
fice for actions occuring [sic] during said term." A third section
states that tribal immunity is not waived automatically by this
provision but has to be "expressly authorized by a majority of
the tribal council in writing."'' 0 The same constitution states
specifically that the writ of habeas corpus is available to any person
against the tribe. 05
Discussion
The 220 tribal constitutions examined for provisions relating
to civil liberties obviously display no uniform pattern. Many do
not deal explicitly with civil liberties at all, and those which do
reflect several basic approaches, some of which seem to be in-
compatible, and deal differently in detailed statement of rights
from federal or state constitutions. Several aspects of these pro-
visions deserve additional comment.
1. While a small minority of constitutions states that the tribe
is culturally different from the surrounding society, a look at
specific provisions dealing with civil liberties reveals that such
cultural differences exist. Particularly, the heavy emphasis on
102. CmCKASAW NATION CONST. art. IV, § 6.
103. PAr INDIAN TRIBE OF UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 1.
104. Id. at 2, 3.




economic equality and the different treatment of rights of the ac-
cused reveal these differences. Nevertheless, it seems puzzling that
more constitutions are not explicit on this point.
2. The large number (fifty-nine) of constitutions stating that
tribal members have the same rights against the tribal government
as those provided in state and/or federal constitutions against non-
Indian governments may constitute a potential threat to tribal
sovereignty, because the most obvious meaning of these provi-
sions is that they go far beyond the ICRA to apply against tribal
governments the full panoply of individual rights developed in
non-Indian contexts. If this interpretation is correct, little is left
of the "right to be different" in this field. William B. Benge,
Chief of the Branch of Law and Order of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs in 1961, told the Ervin Committee that:
some tribes have seen fit when adopting their own tribal con-
stitutions to declare their intention to support and uphold the
laws and Constitution of the United States. In these cases, it
is my opinion that tribal members have the benefit of the same
constitutional guarantees that non-Indians have in relation to
the Federal and State governments." °6
Arthur Lazarus, Jr., appearing before the House Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee in 1968 as counsel for six tribes whose
constitutions had such a provision, noted "the question whether
such language already makes the Federal Bill of Rights applicable
to tribal actions . . ." but did not attempt to answer it. 107 If tribal
governments have deliberately adopted this stance, they of course
have the right to do so. But if these provisions have been adopted
because tribal members were unaware of their potential sweep,
perhaps they should be reexamined.
3. Few tribal constitutions re-cognize explicitly any difference
between the rights enjoyed by members and those enjoyed by non-
members. Failure to spell out such differences could adversely
affect tribal self-government in several ways. First, the restriction
of the right to vote in tribal elections to tribal members could
106. Constitutional Rights of the American Indian: Hearings on S. Res. 53 (Pt. 1)
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., Ist Sess. 139 (1961) [hereinafter American Indian].
107. Rights of Members of Indian Tribes: Hearings on H.R. 15419 Before the Sub-
comm. on Indian Affairs, House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong.
2d Sess. 115 (1968) [hereinafter Tribes].
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be crucial in preventing takeover of tribal governments by non-
Indians, particularly on reservations where there are substantial
numbers of non-Indian residents and landowners. In societies with
provisions incorporating the federal Bill of Rights, in the absence
of an explicit statement to the contrary, it might be argued that
the fifteenth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits restricting voting to tribal members.
Second, economic patterns on most reservations are different
from those of the wider society; unrestricted application of the
Equal Protection provision of the fourteenth Amendment might
undermine these patterns. In 1969, after passage of the ICRA,
Wendell Chino, president of the Mescalero Apache Tribe, told
the Ervin Committee that the ICRA should be amended to
"preserve communal living patterns of Indian people.., which
give to each tribal member his undivided interest in all the tribal
resources and assets. Indian tribes must reserve the right to main-
tain such a community and the tribal structure..." 0 8 Burnett,
in his study of the legislative history of the ICRA, noted that
the draft bill from the Interior Department which closely resembles
the ICRA as it finally cleared Congress had an equal protection
provision applicable only to members of the tribe. However,
Senator Ervin's revision of this draft bill made the equal protec-
tion provision applicable to any person within the jurisdiction of
the tribe. "The significance of the altered wording", said Burnett,
"was that it might be construed to extend equal benefits of tribal
affiliation to non-Indians residing, leasing, or owning property
on reservations, and subject to regulations established by the tribal
councils."'' 9 Again, the constitutions which incorporate all of the
federal Bill of Rights might be read as guaranteeing such a right.
Apart from specific constitutional provisions, an assessment of
the health of both the right to self-government and of individual
liberties in the tribal government context involves many factors.
This article cannot deal fully with all of these questions, but an
attempt will be made here to identify some relevant questions and
comment on some of these having direct bearing on the ICRA.
A crucial but unanswered question is the extent of civil liber-
ties violations by tribal governments. Although the Ervin Com-
108. Amendments to the Indian Bill of Rights: Hearings on Title 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1969) [hereinafter Amendments].
109. Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 9 HMv.




mittee studied the civil liberties of Indians for several years, it
produced no estimate of the extent of the problem, for several
reasons. The Committee investigated "civil liberties violations by
federal, state, and local agencies" as well as by tribal govern-
ments. Moreover, as Burnett concluded, "if the volume of com-
plaints is any guide to the seriousness of a problem, the greatest
threat to the civil liberties of Indians was presented by the en-
forcement of state criminal laws by local authorities in communities
relatively near Indian reservations." ' Provisions of the ICRA
dealt with this issue and others not directly related to civil liber-
ties against tribal governments.
While no one can doubt that some violations of civil liberties
protected by tribal constitutions occur, it is unfortunate that there
is no evidence on the extent of the problem.
Knowledge of constitutional provisions affecting civil liberties
is only one aspect of the question, however. For one thing, a ma-
jority of Native American governments today may operate without
benefit of written constitutions. The 220 societies whose constitu-
tions were examined for this article are only 44.1 percent of the
499 "Indian entities" recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
in 1981, although they constitute 78.5 percent of such societies
in the "Lower Forty-Eight.""' The other societies presumably
deal with civil liberties in traditional ways and the categories
developed to understand civil liberties in the context of nation
states with written constitutions are not applicable to these societies.
Moreover, as with nation states, the actual state of civil liber-
ties undoubtedly depends on factors not accounted for by formal
institutional analysis.
A particularly interesting illustration of this fact, although it
cannot be dealt with in detail here, concerns the changing view-
points of the Navajo Nation toward religious freedom. In the 1950s
and early 1960s, the Tribal Council of the Navajo Nation, the
largest Native society in the United States today, attempted to
prohibit the practice of the peyote religion on the Navajo reser-
vation. III
Although its right to do so was upheld by the courts, the Tribal
Council gradually abandoned the effort and moved toward sup-
port for religious freedom. The first step was a 1967 resolution
110. Id. at 584.
111. Memorandum from Patricia Simmons, Tribal Relations Specialist, to Chief, Branch
of Tribal Relations, Bureau of Indian Affairs (July 21, 1981) (unpublished).
112. See P. IVERSON, THE NAvA.Jo NATION 84-87 (1981).
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entitled the "Declaration of Basic Navajo Human Rights ... "I 13
The first article of this Declaration states, "The Navajo Tribal
Council shall make no law respecting any establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . ." and subsequent clauses
enumerate other rights which will be respected by the Navajo Tribal
Council. While this Declaration did not specifically repeal the anti-
peyote ordinance, it stated that it repealed resolutions "inconsis-
tent therewith." In 1982, the Tribal Council adopted three nearly
identical resolutions specifically protecting religious observances
by the major religious groups represented on the reservation; the
resolutions directed the Navajo Law Enforcement officials to pro-
tect from disturbances "ceremonies performed by Navajo Medicine
Men", "ceremonies of the Native American Churches", and
"religious activities of any recognized religious denomination."
In addition to demonstrating growing tolerance for religious
diversity, it is noteworthy that these actions were in the form of
legislation, not constitutional amendment. This is because the
government of the Navajo Nation is conducted without benefit
of a written constitution. In fact, the basic structure of their govern-
ment was first established by executive action of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs in the 1920s. However, over the decades it has
become a genuinely Navajo structure; when the Collier administra-
tion during the Indian New Deal attempted to get the Navajos
to adopt a written constitution, they refused to do so."14 In other
words, growing protection for civil liberties takes a different form
in traditional Native American societies without written constitu-
tions than in federal, state and local governments in this country.
Undoubtedly the same thing is true of the actual protection of
civil LFiberties in societies which do have written documents.
Another issue is the question of the status and nature of courts
in Indian governments. In few cases are courts independent of
the elected tribal councils which appoint them." ' Tribal
constitution-makers might examine documents such as the Con-
stitution of the Menominee Tribe, one of the newer ones which
does provide for an independent judiciary.
113. Copies of the resolutions cited here were provided to me by Luke P. Deswood,
Director of Records and Communications for the Navajo Nation.
114. For history of the government of the Navajo Nation, see L. KELLY, TrE NAvAJo
INDIANs AND FEDERAL INDIAN PoLicy, 1900-1935 (1968), and D. PARuAN, Tim NAvAJos
AND T NEw DEAL (1976).
115. For a study of Indian courts, see NAT'L. AM. ImnD CT. JunoEs ASS'N, INDIAN




Another important question is the nature of remedies for viola-
tions of civil liberties. After Martinez, not only the definition of
civil liberties, within the restraints of the ICRA, but also the pro-
vision of remedies is largely left up to tribal governments. Only
where a writ of habeas corpus is called for may a federal court
intervene. This situation could change, however, in one or more
of three ways:
A. Section 301 of the ICRA, if implemented in a manner sug-
gested by the United States Supreme Court, could radically change
the remedies available to persons accused of crime in tribal courts.
Section 301 directs the Secretary of the Interior to develop a model
code to be recommended to Congress "to govern the administra-
tion of justice by courts of Indian offenses.. ." The code is to
contain provisions giving persons accused of crime in tribal forums
"the same rights, privileges, and immunities" as persons being
tried for similar offenses in federal courts."1 6 This language
presumably would extend the elaborate protections for persons
accused of crime in the U.S. Constitution to all Indian courts
governed by such a code; if such a code were imposed by Con-
gress on all Indian courts, in effect the ICRA would be extended
dramatically in the criminal area.
Such a code has not yet been presented to Congress, however,
for several reasons. First, there is an existing law and order code
which may be adopted by Indian courts. Second, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs believes, as its representatives told the Ervin Com-
mittee repeatedly, that the differences between Native American
societies are so great that a single model code would be of little
value. Third, on its face Section 301 applies only to Courts of
Indian Offenses, which are courts established by the BIA rather
than tribes. Most reservation courts are tribal courts; in 1961, for
example, there were only four Courts of Indian Offenses, of which
only two used the law and order code. By 1977, there were thirty-
two Courts of Indian Offenses, but seventy-one tribal courts, six-
teen traditional courts, and fifteen conservation courts."'
Nevertheless, there is a potential for use of Section 301 to under-
mine tribal government by wholesale introduction of rights of the
accused developed in non-Indian contexts. The BIA once drew
up such a code and published it in the Federal Register, but has
116. 25 U.S.C. 1311.
117. American Indian, supra note 106, at 50-51; NAT'L. AM. INDIN CT. JuDGEs ASS'N,
supra note 115, at 42.
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never carried the process further."' Moreover, although undoubted-
ly this is a misunderstanding, the Supreme Court in the Martinez
case remarked, "Although [Section 301] by its terms refers only
to courts of Indian offenses, ... the Senate Report makes clear
that the code is intended to serve as a model for use in all tribal
courts." 119 A House report on the bill in 1968 stated that:
The Secretary of the Interior would be directed to draft a
model code of Indian offenses which would apply uniformly
to all Indian courts in Indian country, thus assuring that all
Indians receive equal justice under Indian law. It is also envi-
sioned that the model code would incorporate those rights
enumerated in title I .. .120
Nevertheless, the other evidence from the legislative record con-
tradicts this conclusion, and makes it clear that the code was not
intended to apply to all tribal courts. After representatives of the
New Mexico Pueblos protested that imposition of any code on
them would destroy their traditional systems for dispensing justice,
Senator Ervin sent the House Interior and Insular Affairs Com-
mittee a communication in which he said that "Title II would
be directed only toward Courts of Indian Offenses, which are to
be carefully distinguished from tribal courts."'' A letter from
Atto:rney General Warren Christopher to the same Committee
stated, "Apparently the code would be made applicable only to
those courts of Indian offenses governed by the Department of
the Interior's law and order regulations.... , In a colloquy
between Solicitor Barry of the Interior Department and William
A. Creech, Chief Counsel for the Ervin Committee, the limited
applicability of the model code was again stated. After Barry sug-
gested that the provision might apply to other courts, Creech
assured him that it would not have such wide applicability, finally
stating, "I do think we should reiterate that this particular bill
recognizes and specifies that it would be a model code for the
118. On April 8, 1975, the Department of the Interior published a notice in the Federal
Register of a proposed model code for courts of Indian offenses and announced several
public hearings on the proposal. It was stated that this proposed code was being con-
sidered for presentation to Congress, but evidently the document was never actually presented
to the body. See 40 Fed. Rep. 72, 16689-704 (1975).
119. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 at 70.
120. Tribes, supra note 107, at 14-15.
121. Id. at 136.




courts of Indian offenses only. The code would then have a limited
application, as we understand it."' 23 Nevertheless, Congress, if
it received such a model code, presumably could extend its ap-
plication to all tribal courts.
B. The Supreme Court in Martinez stated that, where tribal
constitutions contain "provisions requiring that tribal ordinances
not be given effect until the Department of Interior gives its ap-
proval ... persons aggrieved by tribal laws may, in addition to
pursuing tribal remedies, be able to seek relief from the Depart-
ment of the Interior." '24 In the wake of Martinez, there have been
attempts by the Department of the Interior to develop procedures
for punishing tribal governments for "extraordinary and deliberate
breach" of tribal constitutions, on the ground that the relation-
ship between the federal government and Native American govern-
ments requires the federal government to remedy such a breach.
These attempts have been criticized, with the assertion, that in-
terference by the federal government in such a manner unaccep-
tably reduces tribal sovereignty, and apparently the BIA has aban-
doned its attempts to interfere with tribal justice in this fashion. 25
Nevertheless, the potential for future administrative action, given
the Supreme Court's apparent endorsement in advance of such
an approach, remains.
C. Given the acceptance by the courts of the notion of plenary
Congressional authority over Native American societies,
presumably the Congress could create new remedies for tribal viola-
tions of civil liberties without waiting for action by the executive
123. American Indian, supra note 106, at 53.
124. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 at 66.
125. GETCHES & Wr.MxNsoN, supra note 1, at 344-45; Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil
Rights Under Tribal Gov't, 12 CAn'. DAvis L. REv. 1, 28-33 (1979). Ziontz ends his
article with this comment: "The Secretary of the Interior bears a heavy responsibility
to avoid interferring with tribal self-government. (T)he Secretary must proceed with great
deference to the autonomy of tribal government. This is clearly required by the central
principle of Martinez: in the absence of contrary congressional direction, ICRA complaints
are to be resolved by the institutions of tribal government. (M)artinez allows the tribes
to implement the ICRA in a manner which preserves their ability to decide difficult ques-
tions in accordance with tribal values, and more importantly, in a manner consistent with
tribal sovereignty." Id. at 35. Former Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Robert L. Bennett
says of this problem: "My view was that the Department should have issued an advisory
memorandum pointing out the tribal government's responsibilities in the Martinez case
with some suggestions as to how these responsibilities might be met rather than through
the issuance of an ultimatum to the tribes." (Personal communication, Aug. 30, 1983).
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branch. Since Martinez the Congress has not devoted much at-
tention to this issue, but in 1988-89 Senator Orin Hatch of Utah
began an effort to create more remedies against tribal governments.
Charles F. Wilkinson has recently addressed this question. He
begins by asserting that:
One cannot completely reconcile classic political rights, as
enjoyed by citizens in other political units in the United States,
with the kind of rights that exist within Indian tribal govern-
ments for the fundamental reason that Indian tribal govern-
ments are literally foreign: they exist outside of the Constitu-
tion. 126
Nevertheless, Wilkinson argues, the present situation is undesirable,
partly because it leaves non-Indians with two few protections
against abuse of authority by tribal governments. He proposes
to expand the jurisdiction of federal courts over tribal govern-
ments, but to make a sharp distinction between procedure and
substance. That is:
federal courts should have jurisdiction to engage in limited review
when ICRA rights are allegedly abridged by tribal institutions.
[But] Reviewing courts would be required to respect tribal tradi-
tions and reservation conditions. 127
Wilkinson also argues that there should be an "elevated standard",
such as "the arbitrary and capricious standard", before tribal deci-
sions can be overruled, and that there should also be rigorous
observance of the rule that tribal remedies should be exhausted
before there is recourse to the federal courts. This approach is
designed to respect the cultural differences which exist between
Native American societies and the general society by allowing the
substance of civil liberties to be different in an Indian context.
What it overlooks is the cultural significance of deciding issues
in courts of the wider society. His proposals would mean substan-
tial alterations in the way tribal institutions operate, and thus the
cultural values of the wider society would at least partially replace
those of the Indian societies. 121
126. C. WMILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, Tam AND Tim LAW 112 (1987).
127. Id. at 115.





To avoid further disruption of Native American culture, a better
way to deal with the question of guaranteeing civil liberties against
tribal governments might be for those governments themselves to
devote more attention to the problem than most of them have
in the past. The tribes themselves have the authority to adopt,
change or abandon constitutions. Thus, they can examine their
cultural practices with respect to civil liberties and spell out precisely
in their governing documents the cultural differences that divide
them from the wider society. Moreover, through the same
mechanism they can develop more effective means of allowing
individuals to assert rights against tribal governments in ways which
will not destroy the limited sovereignty of such governments or
further undermine the "right to be different." Finally, Indian
societies can create new structures above the tribal level for deal-
ing with civil liberties questions. These structures should be deter-
mined by Indians themselves, but it is not difficult to envisage
appellate structures on various bases which might develop creative
new structures for reviewing tribal governmental decisions.
In the meantime, the bottom line remains the same as it has
since the Martinez decision: the protection of individual civil liber-
ties in a tribal context remains primarily the responsibility of Indian
governments. Indians and non-Indians concerned with civil liber-
ties in a tribal context should pay more attention to this question
at the level of tribal government.
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